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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 With the joint written consent of the parties filed 
with the Clerk of the Court, CHILD USA, the National 
Center for Victims of Crime, the National Crime Victim 
Law Institute, the National Organization for Victim 
Assistance, and Arizona Voice for Crime Victims re-
spectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amicus curiae, CHILD USA, a Philadelphia-
based nonprofit think tank, draws on the combined  
expertise of the nation’s leading medical and legal ac-
ademics to reach evidence-based solutions to persis-
tent and widespread problems involving child 
protection. All child victims deserve justice, and 
CHILD USA aims to find the path for them. 
 The National Center for Victims of Crime 
(“NCVC”), a Virginia-based nonprofit organization, is 
the nation’s leading resource and advocacy organiza-
tion for all victims of crime. NCVC is particularly in-
terested in this brief because of its commitment to 
victims of sexual assault and child abuse. 
 
 1 Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and 
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. Counsel for both parties were given ten days notice 
and both parties consented to the filing of this brief. 
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 The National Crime Victim Law Institute 
(“NCVLI”) is a nonprofit educational and advocacy or-
ganization located at Lewis and Clark Law School in 
Portland, Oregon. NCVLI promotes balance and fair-
ness in the justice system through crime victim- 
centered legal advocacy, education, and resource shar-
ing. 
 The National Organization for Victim Assis-
tance (“NOVA”) is a nonprofit organization of victim 
and witness assistance programs, practitioners, agen-
cies, researchers, victims, professionals, and others 
committed to the recognition and implementation of 
victim rights and services. 
 Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc. (“AVCV”) 
is an Arizona nonprofit corporation that works to pro-
mote and protect crime victims’ interests throughout 
the criminal justice process. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Until recently, many states have had child sex 
abuse statutes of limitation that have made it difficult 
for prosecution to occur. See generally Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Justice Denied: What America Must Do to Protect 
Its Children (2012). Victims are cruelly shut out from 
the system of justice through a combination of the ef-
fects of trauma, the power differential with the perpe-
trator, and a legal system inadequate to the task. 
 In Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), this 
Court addressed California’s attempt to resolve the 
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injustice by reviving expired criminal statutes of limi-
tations in all cases of child sex abuse. In a 5-4 decision, 
this Court held that the California law violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. Id. at 633. For a narrow majority of 
the Court, the blanket revival of criminal claims went 
too far. 
 Since Stogner, the science of DNA evidence in sex 
assault cases has become increasingly sophisticated 
and reliable and states have begun to enact laws to 
permit prosecution of child rape where conclusive 
DNA evidence becomes available. See DNA Provi-
sions—Fifty State Survey, CHILD USA, (Oct. 2018), 
www.childusa.org/dnaprovisions. This deeply reliable 
evidence justifies the reopening of a child sexual abuse 
case even when the statute of limitations previously 
expired, because it does not raise the risk of unfairness 
to the perpetrator. It is also necessary to prevent fur-
ther abuse by the now-identified perpetrator. 
 In this case, eight-year-old L.T. was raped in 
her home in the middle of the night. Evidence was 
gathered immediately. The wrong man served a decade 
in prison due to a false conviction. It is now possible, 
due to a later-discovered DNA match with the actual 
perpetrator, to hold the right man accountable. This 
case is a proper vehicle for this Court to consider 
the appropriate interpretation and limits of Stogner v. 
California. By permitting prosecution of child abuse 
perpetrators, this Court would not only be providing 
particular victims access to much-needed justice, but 
would also be aiding in the incarceration of dangerous 
sexual predators before they could abuse more 
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children. Nothing in the Constitution forbids these 
laudable conclusions. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 On March 20, 1987, eight-year-old L.T. was 
raped—orally, vaginally, and anally—in the middle of 
the night in her home in Billings, Montana. She and 
her family immediately reported the crime to the 
police. Police collected physical evidence of the rapist’s 
semen from her. This DNA evidence was preserved. 
 Based on circumstantial evidence, Jimmy Ray 
Bromgard was falsely convicted of the crime and was 
incarcerated for over a decade. 
 In 2014, under the terms of a guilty plea for felony 
drug possession, Montana collected Ronald Tipton’s 
DNA. Utilizing the Combined DNA Index System, or 
CODIS, police conclusively linked Tipton’s DNA to the 
semen on file from L.T.’s rape. The State of Montana 
then sought to prosecute Tipton for his rape of L.T. 
Overruling a detailed decision from the trial court (Pet. 
App. 21-50), the Montana Supreme Court concluded 
that his prosecution was barred as a violation of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, as interpreted in this Court’s opin-
ion in Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). The 
Montana Supreme Court took no pleasure in letting 
Mr. Tipton walk free, explaining that “[t]he crime 
against L.T. . . . was, and remains, a horrific, morally 
repugnant act that the people of Montana expect will 
be punished for the protection of the victim and society. 
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The State’s case against the alleged perpetrator is 
strong, and the scientific evidence is compelling.” Pet. 
App. at 19. 
 Amici curiae urge this Court to grant certiorari so 
that it can examine whether Stogner is distinguishable 
from this case. Because Stogner is either distinguisha-
ble from the facts here—or should be reconsidered in 
circumstances involving newly-discovered DNA evi-
dence—this Court should allow Mr. Tipton’s prosecu-
tion for L.T.’s rape to go forward. 
 
I. THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR 
CHILD SEX ABUSE SHOULD BE GUIDED 
BY THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT, WHICH SUPPORTS MONTANA’S 
LAW PERMITTING REVIVAL OF EXPIRED 
CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
WHEN DNA EVIDENCE IS PRESENT. 
 The lack of prosecution in this case echoes an all-
too-common story, where justice for child victims of 
rape is rarely achieved. The problems are manifold. 
Although this case involves a child reporting almost 
immediately, in many cases victims are unable to come 
forward for decades. In virtually all cases, the crime 
occurs in secret, making corroboration difficult. These 
problems play into the danger for children posed by 
perpetrators. Child molesters often abuse their victims 
for years, leaving numerous victims in their wake over 
the course of a lifetime. This reality makes it all the 
more necessary that sexual assault cases be prose-
cuted whenever possible. 
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 Child sex abuse is a global and national scourge 
that has flourished in, among other places, youth- 
serving organizations and families. On average, one in 
four girls and one in six boys are sexually abused.2 
Most abuse occurs at the hands of those who are in the 
family or closely associated with the victim. This case 
involves the rare instance where abuse was perpe-
trated by a stranger, but even here the perpetrator was 
someone from the community. 
 The adverse affects of childhood trauma are 
indisputable. As explained by the Center for Disease 
Control (“CDC”), Adverse Childhood Experiences 
(“ACEs”) “have a tremendous impact on future violence 
victimization and perpetration, and lifelong health and 
opportunity.” U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Services, 
CDC, About Adverse Childhood Experiences, https://www. 
cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/about_ace.html (Apr. 
1, 2016).3 The ACE Study is one of the largest 
 
 2 NSOPW, Raising Awareness About Sexual Abuse: Facts 
and Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, https://www.nsopw.gov/en- 
US/Education/FactsStatistics?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport= 
1#reference (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see also CDC, Preventing 
Child Abuse & Neglect Fact Sheet, https://www.cdc.gov/violence 
prevention/pdf/CAN-factsheet.pdf (2017) (noting that at least one 
in seven children experienced abuse or neglect within the past 
year—a likely underestimate). Other studies have placed the in-
cidence of sexual abuse of boys as low as 1 in 20, but the 20-25% 
figure for the abuse of girls has remained constant. See National 
Center for Victims of Crime, Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, NCVC, 
http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/ 
child-sexual-abuse-statistics (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 3 Vincent J. Feletti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse 
and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of 
Death in Adults, 14 Am. J. Preventative Med. 4, 245-58 (1998);  
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investigations of the effects of childhood abuse, defini-
tively showing a strong correlation between Adverse 
Childhood Experiences and later impairments.4 Robert 
F. Anda et al., The Enduring Effects of Abuse and 
Related Adverse Experiences in Childhood, 256 EUR. 
ARCH PSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIE. 174, 175 (Nov. 
2005) (“Numerous studies have established that child-
hood stressors such as abuse or witnessing domestic 
violence can lead to a variety of negative health out-
comes and behaviors, such as substance abuse, suicide 
attempts, and depressive disorders.”). 
 Trauma affects childhood victims of sexual abuse 
or assault in a way that is distinct from victims of other 
crimes. Frequently children are so disabled by the 
trauma that they cannot disclose the abuse until much 
later in life. As a direct result of the shame and secrecy 
historically associated with child sex abuse, victims of-
ten remain in the shadows—unable to come forward. 
See, e.g., Judy Cashmore et al., The Characteristics of 
Reports to the Police of Child Sexual Abuse and the 
Likelihood of Cases Proceeding to Prosecution after 
 
S.R. Dube et al., Childhood Abuse, Household Dysfunction, and 
the Risk of Attempted Suicide Throughout the Life Span: Findings 
from the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 286 JAMA 24, 
3089-96 (Dec. 2001) (explaining that childhood trauma can lead 
to negative health outcomes). 
 4 The findings from the ACE study show a strong graded 
relationship between adverse childhood experiences and related 
impairments (e.g., disrupted neurodevelopment; social, emotional, 
and cognitive impairment; disease; disability; etc.). See, e.g., Feletti, 
supra note 3; U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Services, CDC, Adverse 
Childhood Experiences (ACEs), https://www.cdc.gov/violence 
prevention/acestudy/index.html (Apr. 2016). 
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Delays in Reporting, 74 INTL. J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
49, 49-61 (2017) (explaining that delays in disclosing 
and reporting child sexual abuse to the police are com-
mon); Katie Wright et al., The Australian Royal Com-
mission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual 
Abuse, 74 INTL. J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1, 4 (2017) 
(suggesting that on average it took victims over twenty 
years to disclose their abuse). At least thirty-three per-
cent of such cases are never reported. See id.; see also 
Mary-Ellen Pipe et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Disclosure, 
Delay, and Denial 32 (2013) (“failure to disclose is com-
mon among sexually abused children.”). 
 When a report is made, many other barriers to 
successful prosecution often exist. These problems cre-
ate ample opportunities for perpetrators.5 After abuse 
is reported, “[a]dults tend to protect other adults and 
the reputation of institutions—even when it comes to 
an issue as serious as child sexual abuse.” Marci A. 
Hamilton, The Barriers to a National Inquiry into 
Child Sexual Abuse in the United States, 74 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 107, 107 (2017). As a consequence, 
sexual assault cases are regularly dismissed against 
perpetrators or never brought in the first place due to 
 
 5 See generally BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE 
SCORE: BRAIN MIND AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA 
(2014); Penelope K. Trickett et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse on 
Female Development: Lessons from a Multigenerational, Longitu-
dinal Research Study, 23 DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, 
453-76 (2011); S. Berkowitz et al., The Child and Family Trau-
matic Stress Intervention: Secondary Prevention for Youth at Risk 
Youth of Developing PTSD, 52 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY 
676, 676-85 (Jun. 2011). 
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the trauma effects, the difficulty of proof, and the stat-
ute of limitations. See, e.g., Yonat Shimron, Judge Dis-
misses Sexual Assault Claims Against Southern 
Baptist Leader, RELIGION NEWS, Oct. 18, 2018; Deanna 
Paul, Utah Refused to Prosecute Four Sexual Assault 
Cases, so the Alleged Victims Set Out to Do It Them-
selves, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2018. 
 In light of this research, the Court should consider 
Montana’s petition against the backdrop of the harm-
ful consequences whenever a child sexual assault 
crime is not prosecuted. 
 
II. DNA EVIDENCE CAN BOTH CONVICT THE 
GUILTY AND SPARE THE INNOCENT OF A 
FALSE CONVICTION, AS WOULD HAPPEN 
IN THIS CASE IF THE COURT REVERSES 
THE DECISION BELOW. 
 In considering effective prosecution of sexual as-
sault cases, the development of DNA evidence offers a 
unique remedy. For many cases (such as this one), DNA 
evidence offers a solution to ensure that the guilty are 
punished while the innocent are not harmed. 
 DNA was first used in a 1987 criminal case in Flor-
ida, to prove Tommie Lee Andrews guilty of rape.6 DNA 
evidence matched Andrews’ DNA to the crime’s physi-
cal evidence. Jeffrey Lee Ashton, Foundation for DNA 
Fingerprint Evidence, 8 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 
 
 6 It has been approved by the Montana Supreme Court for 
use in the State since 1994. Montana v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457 
(Mont. 1994). 
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740, § 2 (2018). In the Andrews case (as in many oth-
ers), DNA evidence made it possible to “determine 
identity to a virtual certainty.” Id. at § 4. 
 This Court underscored the importance and cer-
tainty of DNA evidence in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 
435 (2013). In that case, this Court recognized that 
criminals use name, appearance, and other changes to 
conceal themselves from the police. Id. at 443. They 
may carry false IDs and their criminal records may be 
inaccurate. Id. In such difficult circumstances, DNA 
provides “unparalleled accuracy” in identification to 
help the police do their job and achieve justice for 
crime victims. Id. at 450; see also National Research 
Council of the National Academies, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
130 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
228091.pdf (explaining that DNA typing is “univer-
sally recognized as the standard [against which other 
techniques are judged . . . ] because of its reliability.”). 
 In King, this Court raised a theoretical concern 
about what actually happened in this case, where the 
innocent Mr. Bromgard was imprisoned while the 
guilty Mr. Tipton remained free. Often, the Court ex-
plained, when DNA evidence is not used, criminals are 
not arrested and instead are left free to commit addi-
tional crimes. Id. at 453. 
 King also noted the importance of DNA evidence 
to victims, pointing out the dangers of a criminal aware 
of DNA: “For example, a defendant who had committed 
a prior sexual assault might be inclined to flee on a 
11 
 
burglary charge, knowing that in every State a DNA 
sample would be taken from him after his conviction 
on the burglary charge that would tie him to the more 
serious charge of rape.” Id. at 456. Victims remain at 
risk whenever a person guilty of sexual assault re-
mains free. Indeed, in one study of what happened 
when a person was wrongfully convicted of a sexual as-
sault, actual offenders who were not arrested for their 
crimes committed numerous additional crimes. James 
R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convic-
tions: When the Guilty Go Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 
1632 (2013). 
 Public confidence in the justice system drops 
dramatically when the innocent are convicted while 
the guilty go free. Using DNA evidence properly can 
rebuild confidence in the system and contribute to 
greater protection for children. For that reason, the 
“most ardent law enforcement enthusiasts and the 
most passionate civil libertarians should have no 
disagreement about the desirability of disabling repeat 
violent offenders from claiming new victims, or of spar-
ing innocent parties the pains and injustice of wrong-
ful conviction and punishment.” Id. at 1711. 
 Bringing sexual assault offenders to justice is 
uniquely important in the criminal justice system. 
The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional 
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (“Australian Royal 
Commission”), frequently lauded as the gold standard 
of national investigations into childhood sexual abuse, 
emphasizes the importance of testimonial-based 
12 
 
inquiry.7 In a report derived from hearings by the 
Commission, Professor Shurlee Swain explains that 
through listening to testimony from victims and survi-
vors, “the wrongdoing is recognized, victims are repo-
sitioned as moral equals, and their right to harbor 
feelings of anger and resentment is acknowledged.” 
Shurlee Swain, History of Australian Inquiries Review-
ing Institutions Providing Care for Children, 10 (2014). 
DNA is the investigative tool that cuts through perpe-
trators’ ready-made false defenses. 
 By listening to victims, we also learn to recognize 
manipulative behaviors relied on by predators. 
DARVO, or Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and 
Offender, is a scientific term regularly used by sexual 
assault experts to describe common patterns of of-
fender behavior.8 The strategy is simple: to gain sym-
pathy by claiming to be the true victim, thereby 
derailing any investigation into the allegations.9 
 
 7 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child 
Sexual Abuse, Commonwealth of Australia (2017), https://www. 
childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/final-report/. 
 8 See Jennifer Freyd Ph.D., Violations of Power, Adaptive 
Blindness & Betrayal Trauma Theory, 7 J. FEMINISM & PSYCHOL-
OGY 22 (1997) (explaining the DARVO strategy employed by per-
petrators as silencing victims to escape culpability, minimizing or 
denying the abuse, attacking the victim’s credibility, and playing 
the victim themselves). 
 9 Sarah J. Harsey et al., Perpetrator Responses to Victim Con-
frontation: DARVO and Victim Self-Blame, 26:6 J. AGGRESSION, 
MALTREATMENT, & TRAUMA, 644, 644-63 (2017) (showing that DARVO 
“was commonly experienced by individuals who confronted 
another [ ] over a wide variety of wrong-doings . . . [and] that 
DARVO exposure was related to the . . . participants’ negative 
emotions felt about the confrontation when it occurred”). 
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Forceful denials of guilt are textbook for perpetrators 
of abuse and remain an effective tool for perpetrators 
to “assume[ ] the role of ‘falsely accused’ and attack[ ] 
the accuser’s credibility” thus blaming “the accuser 
of being the perpetrator of a false accusation.” Jennifer 
Freyd, Ph.D., Research—DARVO, https://www.jjfreyd. 
com/research. DARVO poses additional problems for 
fact-finders because of the way that guilty perpetrators 
react—shifting blame. 
 In cases where DNA evidence is available, provid-
ing clear scientific proof linking an individual to a 
crime against a child, an arbitrary procedural deadline 
should not be permitted to trump science to prevent 
holding child predators accountable. This countervail-
ing interest in protecting children is a compelling in-
terest of the highest order. Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1740 (2017). It is also a mat-
ter of fundamental fairness. DNA evidence is admissi-
ble to reverse a conviction: defendants are permitted to 
assert it as a shield against false convictions. See gen-
erally National Research Council of the National Acad-
emies, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward (2009), supra. If a convicted de-
fendant can re-open a conviction upon the discovery of 
new DNA evidence, fairness demands that a victim 
should be able to invoke DNA evidence to reopen the 
possibility of criminal prosecution for sexual abuse. 
 Here, reliable DNA evidence links Tipton to the 
rape of L.T. The Court should grant the petition to de-
termine whether its prior precedents truly require the 
affront to justice that would come for ignoring a 
14 
 
clearly-established scientific link showing who was re-
sponsible for this truly heinous crime. 
 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE 
IMPORTANT AND RECURRING ISSUE OF 
WHETHER ALLOWING PROSECUTION IN 
CASES WITH NEWLY DISCOVERED DNA 
EVIDENCE VIOLATES THE EX POST 
FACTO CLAUSE. 
 Montana’s petition asks this Court to review the 
decision below, which refused to allow application of 
Montana’s duly enacted law allowing for an extension 
of the statute of limitations based on newly-discovered 
DNA evidence. This law was designed to bring justice 
to victims of past sex offenses and to prevent future 
victimization of other victims. This Court should grant 
certiorari on this recurring question, which is of crucial 
importance to child sexual assault victims. 
 The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids any state from 
passing “any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1. As its language suggests—and as this Court 
has recognized for more than 200 years—the prohibi-
tion is restricted to criminal cases such as this one. See 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). In Stogner v. Cal-
ifornia, 593 U.S. 607 (2003), this Court applied the Ex 
Post Facto Clause and held unconstitutional a Califor-
nia law that broadly permitted “resurrection of other-
wise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and . . . was 
itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had 
expired.” Id. at 609. 
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 In this case, four years after Stogner, Montana 
enacted a much narrower law, focusing specifically on 
situations involving new and conclusive DNA testing: 
“If a suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing 
after a time period prescribed in subsection (1)(b) or 
(1)(c) has expired, a prosecution may be commenced 
within 1 year after the suspect is conclusively identi-
fied by DNA testing.” Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205(9). 
No doubt, the Montana legislature thought it was 
complying with federal constitutional limits. Mon-
tana’s law fits within a broad national pattern of com-
parable legislation. More than half the states have now 
enacted DNA-triggered criminal child sex abuse stat-
utes of limitation in some form or another.10 As the na-
tional CODIS database has expanded, “cold hits” like 
the one in this case have increasingly allowed law en-
forcement to identify criminals who have committed 
sex offenses. 
 In its decision below, the Montana Supreme Court 
interpreted Stogner overbroadly to conclude that it 
could not apply Montana’s statute to this case. The 
Court appeared reluctant to do so, noting that “[t]he 
State’s case against the alleged perpetrator is strong, 
and the scientific evidence is compelling.” Pet. App. 18. 
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that it was bound to 
follow Stogner: “Stogner compels us to hold that the 
charges against Tipton must be dismissed.” Id. 
 
 10 See DNA Provisions—Fifty State Survey, CHILD USA, 
(Oct. 2018), www.childusa.org/dnaprovisions. 
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 Before this remarkable failure of justice is allowed 
to occur—both in the case at hand and other similar 
ones that will inevitably follow—this Court should re-
view the decision below. The Court below erred by fail-
ing to distinguish the California one-size-fits-all child 
sex abuse statute from Montana’s tailored law that 
protects the innocent by permitting later prosecution 
only where there is conclusive DNA evidence. This 
Court should grant certiorari to either clarify that  
Stogner does not preclude States from enacting the 
kind of narrowly drawn statute at issue here or over-
rule Stogner to permit application of such statutes in 
circumstances such as this case. 
 
A. Montana’s Narrow DNA Statute Allowing 
Revival of Claims for a Limited Period of 
Time is Distinguishable from the Broad 
Statute at Issue in Stogner. 
 When the Montana Supreme Court interpreted 
Stogner, it attempted to apply the Ex Post Facto prin-
ciples explained by this Court. The Court below stated 
that the “Clause protects liberty by prohibiting stat-
utes with manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive 
effects.” Pet. App. at 9. The Clause prevents “unfair and 
dishonest” legislation that deprives people of “fair 
warning” that they may be subject to prosecution and 
that they need to preserve evidence of their innocence. 
Id. at 13. It thus protects against “arbitrary and poten-
tially vindictive legislation.” Id. (citing Stogner, 539 
U.S. at 611). Allowing Montana’s DNA law to be ap-
plied in this case does none of these things. It does not 
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manifest unjust and oppressive retroactive effects, de-
prive people of fair warning, or apply arbitrarily and 
vindictively. To the contrary, the law based on conclu-
sive DNA evidence cuts through all these concerns. 
 At its core, an ex post facto law is a law which, in 
its operation, makes criminal an act which was not so 
when it was performed, which increases the punish-
ment for such an act, or which, relative to the act, 
changes the position of a party to his or her disad-
vantage. In Stogner v. California, this Court acknowl-
edged that all discussions of ex post facto laws return 
to Justice Chase’s definition in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 
386 (1798), a case that “this Court has recognized as 
providing an authoritative account of the scope of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 611. In  
Stogner, the majority and the dissent debated the 
meanings of Chase’s definitions and disagreed about 
their application to the California statute that resur-
rected time-barred criminal prosecutions for all child 
sex abuse cases. Ultimately, Stogner hinged on the sec-
ond category offered by Justice Chase, which was that 
ex post facto laws included “[e]very law that aggravates 
a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when commit-
ted.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390–91 (emphasis added). The 
Stogner majority concluded that this category included 
California’s broad law. 539 U.S. at 620-21. The dissent 
disagreed. Id. at 639-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 But whatever the competing merits of these re-
spective positions in that case (a subject discussed be-
low), this case stands on different factual footing. 
These differences were clearly explained by the trial 
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court, which compared the statute at issue in Stogner 
with the statute at issue here: 
Stogner, decided in 2003, was based on a Cal-
ifornia statute that resurrected old sex 
crimes. The California statute was originally 
amended in 1993 and specifically dealt with 
delayed reporting by alleged victims, usually 
family members. Stogner never mentioned 
DNA evidence in relation to the statute of lim-
itation nor did it address any amendment to a 
statute of limitation dealing directly with 
DNA evidence like the 2007 DNA amendment 
to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205. This is a key 
difference between the 1993 California stat-
ute and the 2007 Montana amendment. 
Pet. App. at 42-43. The trial court carefully analyzed 
why Stogner did not prevent application of the Mon-
tana provision. The trial court explained that “[t]he 
Montana legislature, unlike California’s legislature in 
Stogner, did not allow for the revival of any and all pre-
vious causes of actions that would have been time 
barred under a statute of limitation.” Id. at 46. Instead, 
Montana had revived a very limited class of cases: 
DNA cases. As the court explained, “This DNA law dif-
fers completely from the law reviving all causes of ac-
tions in Stogner—Montana’s law is highly specific and 
requires a conclusive DNA match before prosecution 
can occur.” Id. at 47. As an additional safeguard 
against ex post facto concerns, the trial court noted 
“the 2007 amendment restricts the time the State has 
to initiate prosecution to one year.” Id. 
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 The trial court further explored possible prejudice 
to Mr. Tipton from application of the new law, finding 
none. The trial court explained that “Mr. Tipton has not 
been deprived of any defense available under the law 
at the time the act was committed.” Id. at 47. Moreover, 
while Stogner “discussed lack of evidence and concerns 
about problems with the memories of witnesses” in 
cases that were revived, in this case “DNA and its sci-
entific validation” provided conclusive evidence and 
“[t]he law enforcement records and witness statements 
from March of 1987 have been maintained.” Id. 
 The trial court also discussed particular facts “dis-
tinguish[ing] this case from Stogner and highlight[ing] 
the manifest injustice which would result” if the 2007 
amendment were not allowed to apply. Id. at 48. First, 
the victim and the State “believed her perpetrator was 
behind bars from 1988 through 2002.” As a result, nei-
ther the victim nor the police were looking for another 
suspect during that time—meaning the case went cold, 
even after the original suspect was released. Id. 
 Second, Mr. Tipton’s decision to commit an addi-
tional crime led to the discovery that he had perpe-
trated the crime. In 2014, Tipton was convicted of the 
felony of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Id. 
As a result of that conviction, Tipton had to provide a 
DNA sample to be kept in the CODIS database. As the 
trial court explained, “But for Mr. Tipton’s new crimi-
nal conduct the State may never have located him and 
L.T.’s case would have remained cold.” Id. at 49. 
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 In light of all these circumstances, the trial court 
found that this Court’s decision in Stogner did not con-
trol. As the trial court explained, “It is hard to believe 
these facts are the type contemplated by the Stogner 
Court as it addressed the California law allowing res-
urrection of any and all previous rapes having been 
time barred. These facts are wholly different from the 
Stogner facts.” Id. at 49. The trial court’s ultimate con-
clusion: “Fairness dictates this matter proceed to trial.” 
Id. 
 It is true, of course, that the trial court’s conclusion 
can be disputed. For example, the Montana Supreme 
Court disagreed, believing its hands were tied because 
Stogner “leaves no room to balance the State’s and the 
victim’s interests against the defendant’s constitu-
tional right to be free from ex post facto laws.” Id. at 17. 
This very disagreement reveals the existence of seri-
ous arguments about the scope and reach of Stogner—
arguments that this Court should fully consider by 
granting certiorari before a terrible injustice is allowed 
to occur in this and similar cases. 
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B. To the Extent that Dicta in Stogner Re-
quire Holding that Application of the 
Montana Law is Barred by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, the Court Should Con-
sider Overruling that Dicta as Applied 
to DNA-Triggered Child Sex Abuse 
Statutes of Limitations. 
 Even if this Court were to read dicta in Stogner as 
preventing application of Montana’s DNA law in this 
case—and by implication similar DNA-triggered stat-
utes in many other states—the Court should still grant 
certiorari and reconsider that particular aspect of  
Stogner, overruling Stogner to permit justice here and 
in other comparable cases. This Court has not hesi-
tated to overrule other decisions that have prevented 
justice for crime victims. Most notably, in Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), this Court overruled two 
earlier decisions barring the use of victim impact state-
ments in capital cases. This Court explained that those 
decisions “were decided by the narrowest of margins, 
over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpin-
nings of those decisions.” Id. at 828-29. 
 Of course, exactly the same can be said here. Jus-
tice Kennedy’s “spirited” dissent (joined by three other 
justices) challenged the “basic underpinnings” of  
Stogner. Justice Kennedy explained that the Court’s 
decision “disregards the interests of those victims of 
child abuse who have found the courage to face their 
abusers and bring them to justice. The Court’s opinion 
harms not only our ex post facto jurisprudence but also 
these and future victims of child abuse, and so compels 
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my respectful dissent.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 653 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). 
 In Payne, the Court was also concerned that “[j]us-
tice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser 
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till 
it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance 
true.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827); see also id. at 833 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (noting the “injustice of requiring the 
exclusion of relevant aggravating evidence during cap-
ital sentencing, while requiring the admission of all 
relevant mitigating evidence”). In an effort to “keep the 
balance true,” Payne overruled an evidentiary limita-
tion in a criminal prosecution that was already moving 
forward. In this case, however, the injustice is far more 
serious than a mere debate over what evidence can be 
admitted. If Stogner is allowed to block application of 
Montana’s law (and many similar DNA provisions in 
other states), justice will be entirely denied for L.T. and 
others who have been the victims of child sex abuse in 
similar circumstances. The scales of justice will have 
tipped entirely towards child sexual abusers who can 
succeed in running out the clock. 
 Justice Kennedy presciently warned of such dan-
gers in his dissent in Stogner. He noted the importance 
of extending statutes of limitations in cases such as 
this one, because “young victims often delay reporting 
sexual abuse because they are easily manipulated by 
offenders in positions of authority and trust, and be-
cause children have difficulty remembering the crime 
or facing the trauma it can cause.” Stogner, 539 U.S. at 
650 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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 Justice Kennedy also addressed whether child sex 
abusers had any sort of “reliance” interest that would 
somehow be disrupted by extending statutes of limita-
tions. Justice Kennedy powerfully dismissed such con-
cerns, explaining (with supporting studies) that 
“[w]hen a child molester commits his offense, he is well 
aware the harm will plague the victim for a lifetime.” 
Stogner, 539 U.S. at 651 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 Justice Kennedy wrote eloquently of the pain of 
children who have been sexually victimized, who have 
suffered “deep and lasting hurt.” 539 U.S. at 652 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). Against that backdrop of suffer-
ing, the “only poor remedy is that the law will show its 
compassion and concern when the victim at last can 
find the strength, and know the necessity, to come for-
ward. When the criminal has taken distinct advantage 
of the tender years and perilous position of a fearful 
victim, it is the victim’s lasting hurt, not the perpetra-
tor’s fictional reliance, that the law should count the 
higher.” Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 Justice Kennedy expressed grave concern about 
the outcome in Stogner, noting that child sexual abuse 
victims “have reported the crimes so that the violators 
are brought to justice and harm to others is prevented. 
The Court now tells the victims their decision to come 
forward is in vain.” Id. at 651-52 (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing). In this case, L.T. has come forward—seeking jus-
tice for herself and to prevent others from suffering as 
she has. This Court should, at least, grant the petition 
for certiorari to evaluate whether DNA-triggered stat-
utes present a new circumstance that Stogner did not 
have the opportunity to evaluate. 
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 The science is clear as to why so few child preda-
tors are prosecuted. Child victims of sexual abuse often 
delay reporting as a result of the trauma associated.11 
Indeed, the average age of reporting is 52. One-third of 
victims never disclose their abuse.12 The barriers to 
disclosure are compounded by the defendants’ tactics 
to deny culpability, e.g., the approach whereby abusers 
deny, attack, and try to reverse the roles of victim and 
aggressor. When a child victim is able to report imme-
diately and DNA can be gathered and preserved, prov-
ing conclusively who has committed a terrible crime, 
nothing in the Constitution prevents Montana and 
other states from deciding that they want to make jus-
tice possible. Indeed, this Court has quite recently rec-
ognized that “protecting children from abuse is a 
compelling state interest.” Packingham v. North Caro-
lina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1740 (2017). 
 The fact that Montana (and many other states) 
have enacted DNA-triggered statutes permitting 
prosecutions in cases such as this one, even after 
Stogner, suggests ex post facto prohibitions are not 
commonly understood in the same wooden fashion as 
Stogner appears to have understood them. In similar 
circumstances, “when this Court has confronted a 
wrongly decided, unworkable precedent calling for 
 
 11 See, e.g., S. Berkowitz et al., The Child and Family Trau-
matic Stress Intervention: Secondary Prevention for Youth at Risk 
Youth of Developing PTSD, 52 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY, 
676-85 (Jun. 2011). 
 12 CHILD USA, Average and Median Age of CSA Disclosure, 
(2018), www.childusa.org/law. 
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some further action by the Court, we have chosen not 
to compound the original error, but to overrule the 
precedent.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 842-43 (Souter, J., con-
curring). The Court should do that same thing here. 
 By granting certiorari and overturning the deci-
sion below, this Court can permit Montana prosecutors 
to try to respond to the “deep and lasting hurt” that 
L.T. faced when she was raped at eight years old. Sadly, 
the interests at stake in this case extend far beyond 
L.T. They include many other children who will not see 
justice if DNA-triggered statutes involving sexual 
predators whose guilt can be conclusively proven are 
not allowed to operate. Indeed, at a fundamental level, 
what is at stake is whether to leave unreviewed a “de-
cision contrary to the public sense of justice,” which 
will inevitably “operate[ ] . . . to diminish respect for 
the courts and for law itself.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 The Court below explained that “[t]he crime 
against L.T. more than thirty years ago was, and 
remains, a horrific, morally repugnant act that the 
people of Montana expect will be punished for the pro-
tection of the victim and society.” Pet. App. at 19. And 
yet the Court reluctantly concluded that Stogner re-
quired it to let Mr. Tipton walk free. This Court should 
review that decision, as justice will not be served if the 
decision below is allowed to stand. This Court should 
not interpret the Constitution to require such manifest 
injustice. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 This Court should grant certiorari, reverse the de-
cision below, and permit Montana’s and other states’ 
laws to extend child sex abuse statutes of limitations 
based on later-identified DNA evidence. 
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